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CHAPTER 1: SPECIFIC AIMS 
 Although some age-related decline in memory functioning is normal, many middle-aged 
or older individuals interpret everyday memory lapses as indicators of the development of 
dementia, or Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in particular.  While a fleeting thought about the 
development of AD may not be harmful, repeated misperception of attention and memory 
failures can be much more detrimental.  This phenomenon, known as fear of Alzheimer’s disease 
(FAD) or anticipatory dementia, may lead to hyper-vigilance for AD symptoms, decreased self-
efficacy, depression and anxiety.  These symptoms reciprocally worsen attention and memory 
performance, potentially creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of memory decline. 
Despite the negative impact of FAD in the middle-aged and older adult populations, few 
studies have been conducted to assess the construct.  Little is known about the conceptual 
overlap between FAD and other important metacognitive processes, such as prospective 
appraisal of memory abilities and subjective memory complaints (SMCs).  Furthermore, 
researchers have not yet established the relationship between FAD and objective memory ability.  
Although FAD has been tied to greater trait-level anxiety (French, Floyd, Wilkins & Osato, 
2012), little is known about the practical implications that FAD has on compensatory cognitive 
and health behaviors. 
A primary goal of this study was to establish the construct validity of FAD through 
assessing its conceptual overlap with Judgment of Learning (JOL) and SMCs. Although one 
scale currently exists to evaluate general fear, physical symptoms, and catastrophic attitude 
associated with FAD (French, Floyd, Wilkins & Osato, 2011), this scale has shortcomings.  
There are several potentially important aspects of the construct, including knowledge about AD 
development and prevalence, and locus of control/self-efficacy for preventing or treating 
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dementia, which are not included in the FAD construct.  The present study has also developed 
and validated a new scale of FAD that assesses different dimensions of the construct more 
effectively than existing measures. 
 A second aim of the study was to investigate the relative ability of different types of 
metamemory tests to explain variance in objective memory functioning.  The study assessed how 
SMCs, FAD, and metacognitive monitoring during a Judgment of Learning task account for 
variance on an objective memory test. 
 A third aim of the study was to investigate the relationships between FAD and 
metacognitive monitoring and control.  The study examined how individuals with high and low 
FAD estimate their memory ability for a list-learning task.  This judgment of learning task 
informs whether middle-aged and older adults with varying levels of FAD update their memory 
appraisals based on self-monitoring of performance on the task.  Finally, the study investigated 
the extent to which individuals with different levels of FAD utilize metacognitive control, or 
behavioral strategies to compensate for their perceived memory problems. 
Specific Aim 1 
 The study evaluated the construct validity of fear of Alzheimer’s disease (FAD) using 
measures of general negative affect, subjective memory complaints (SMCs), judgment of 
learning (JOL), and a novel measure of FAD.  It was hypothesized that (a) individuals with a 
family history of Alzheimer’s disease would have greater FAD.  Also, it was proposed that FAD 
is positively associated with (b) SMCs and (c) general negative affect.  FAD was also expected 
to be (d) negatively associated with JOL appraisals and accuracy of those appraisals.  It was also 
hypothesized that (e) negative affect, SMCs and JOL would account for a relatively small 
proportion of variance in FAD, as FAD is a unique construct.  Last, it was hypothesized that (f) 
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scores on a newly developed scale of FAD are related to scores on existing measures of FAD, 
but do not overlap completely.  It was proposed that the novel measure assesses new aspects of 
FAD not covered by these existing tests, including knowledge about normal versus abnormal 
forgetting in older adulthood, prevalence and causes of and treatments available for AD, health-
specific and AD-specific locus of control, beliefs about personal susceptibility to AD, negative 
affect related to AD thoughts, and specific fears and living with AD. 
Specific Aim 2 
 The study determined the relative ability of FAD, SMCs, JOL appraisal (metacognitive 
monitoring) and engagement in compensatory behaviors (metacognitive control) to account for 
variance in objective memory functioning in cognitively intact older adults. It was hypothesized 
that (a) SMCs, FAD and difference in study behavior (study time on self-paced list-learning 
trials as compared to matched computer-paced trials) are not significantly associated with 
objective memory functioning.  However, (b) JOL estimates were expected to account for a 
significant proportion of variance in objective memory functioning. It was also hypothesized that 
(c) of all the FAD and metacognitive variables, metacognitive monitoring accounts for the most 
variance in objective memory functioning after controlling for age and education. 
Specific Aim 3 
 The study determined whether FAD is associated with changes in metacognitive 
monitoring accuracy and implementation of control strategies in cognitively intact older adults.   
It was hypothesized that (a) metacognitive monitoring, in the form of JOL estimates, is 
significantly associated with metacognitive control, measured by study time on subsequent trials.  
It was also hypothesized that (b) individuals low in FAD produce smaller difference scores 
between the predicted and actual number of items remembered across all learning trials.  They 
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were also expected to study a list of 20 words for a shorter amount of time than individuals high 
in FAD, and to vary study time based on perceived performance (i.e. utilize longer study time 
when objective memory performance was below expectation).  Conversely, (c) individuals high 
in FAD were expected to underestimate their memory ability for all trials, creating larger 
difference scores between the predicted and actual number of items recalled.  It was 
hypothesized that they would not increase their study time based on perceived task performance.  
Instead, they were expected to consistently utilize the maximum study time allotted, regardless 


















CHAPTER 2: GENERAL BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
It is estimated that approximately 5.4 million Americans were diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in 2012, over 95% of whom were over the age of 65 (Hebert, Scherr, 
Bienias, Bennett, & Evans, 2003).  Furthermore, one in nine people over the age of 65 and one-
third of people over the age of 85 will be diagnosed with the disease (Alzheimer’s Association, 
2014).  Dementia, and AD in particular, is a problem of growing concern not only for the aging 
baby-boomer generation, but also for their caretakers, who make up over 15 million Americans 
(Alzheimer’s Association, 2012).  The costs of short- and long-term healthcare and hospice for 
individuals with AD are significant, totaling an estimated 150 billion dollars in the United States 
alone (Alzheimer’s Association, 2014). 
Public perception of AD has changed with increased scientific knowledge about the 
disorder.  While the majority of people in the United States are aware of AD as a source of 
memory problems, very few individuals have specific knowledge about AD symptoms, 
preventative lifestyle changes, and treatments (Anderson, Day, Beard, Reed, & Wu, 2009).  A 
lack of specific knowledge about AD or its etiology may contribute to widespread concern about 
development of the disorder.  In the population of Americans 18 years of age and older, 
approximately 60% cite major concern about age-related memory loss (Anderson, Day, Beard, 
Reed & Wu, 2009). 
For younger adults, fear of developing AD is poignant but abstract.  For middle-aged and 
older adults, everyday ‘normal’ lapses in memory may provide concrete ‘evidence’ for greater 
worry.  For example, while a failure to remember an appointment, the location of one’s keys, or 
the name of a new acquaintance might not be interpreted in the context of AD risk in younger 
adults, middle-aged and older adults might perceive these instances as harbingers of a more 
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significant and frightening memory disorder.  This fear of Alzheimer’s disease (FAD), also 
known as anticipatory dementia, has significant impacts on health, regardless of whether the fear 
is warranted.  FAD may contribute to the 6-10% prevalence rate of anxiety disorders among 
older adults (Schuurmanns & van Balkom, 2011).  Anxiety disorders, in turn, have significant 
negative impacts on health, including seeking of more somatic health care visits but decreased 
use of mental health care services, poorer cardiac health, and increased mortality in men or frail 
older adults (Schuurmans & van Balkom, 2011).  Despite evidence to the contrary (Schurrmans 
& van Balkom, 2011), there is a popular belief that anxiety and other affective problems may be 
an early indicator of dementia.  In the case of FAD, this anxiety is circular; having greater fear of 
developing dementia causes anxiety, which is seen as confirmation of the impending cognitive 
decline. 
Memory functioning is critical for the performance of day-to-day tasks and independent 
living, but awareness of one’s memory and other cognitive abilities is equally important. 
Metacognition refers to the thoughts, beliefs, and mental processes used to assess and control 
cognition.  In regards to memory specifically, metacognition refers to the monitoring of one’s 
memory successes and failures, as well as the difficulty of encoding and retrieving information 
(Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006; Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011).  Meta-memory 
also refers to control, the motivation and direction of one’s behaviors to compensate for these 
failures in order to increase successes (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006; 
Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011).  Older adults fearful of developing dementia may monitor their 
memory failures more closely and may be more sensitive to retrieval struggles than older adults 
who feel less vulnerable to AD.  Older adults high in FAD may also control their behavior in 
particular ways to accommodate their perceived memory impairments, such as utilizing 
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calendars and written mnemonic aids, relying on family members or caregivers for reminders, or 
seeking of medical treatment. 
Significance of the Current Study 
In the context of existing research that has examined these behaviors, it appears that a 
better understanding of the construct of FAD is needed. Furthermore, whether or to what extent 
it might relate to and impact objective memory functioning and meta-memory has received 
relatively little attention in the research literature.  This study will develop and validate a novel 
measure of FAD, and it will use this measure to determine the extent to which FAD interferes 
with memory monitoring and compensation for poor perceived memory.  This research also 
provides important benefits for clinical work.  A novel measure will greatly improve assessment 
of dementia-specific worry, allowing for identification of older adults at greater risk for anxiety 
disorders and associated problems.  Better understanding of the relationship between FAD, 
SMCs, metacognitive monitoring and actual memory performance may provide the basis for a 
predictive model of objective memory functioning.  Furthermore, the study will allow 
researchers to identify individuals who might benefit from psychoeducation about normal 
memory aging and AD, balancing of expectations about cognitive decline, and training in 
compensatory memory strategies.  This study may also identify individuals more likely to rely on 
memory aids, cognitively challenging activities and games to improve their own performance, 
versus individuals who may rely on caregivers to monitor and accommodate memory decline. 
The following sections include a more detailed review of the current research on FAD, 
SMCs, and metacognitive monitoring and control of memory abilities.  The function of this 
review is to provide a context for the current study and identify gaps in the literature that may be 
addressed by the current study. 
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Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease 
FAD, also known as anticipatory dementia, was originally conceptualized as the tendency 
of adult children of AD patients to be worried that their age-associated memory changes are a 
signal of impending cognitive decline due to AD (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996).  This phenomenon 
is not restricted to children of AD patients but is a widespread concern for middle-aged and older 
adults (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996).  Approximately 60% of American and European individuals 
(Anderson, Day, Beard, Reed & Wu, 2009; Cantegreil-Kallen & Pin, 2012) and 46% of Israeli 
older adults (Werner, 2002) cite memory impairment as a major source of concern.  In France, 
perception of the seriousness of AD has increased in recent years (Leon et al., 2015).  In parallel, 
belief in the efficacy of treatments and the normalcy of memory loss with age has decreased 
(Leon et al., 2015). 
In attempting to explain why healthy people might perceive their memory problems as 
disordered, researchers have found that greater knowledge of the disorder not only fails to 
inoculate people against worry, but it may actually increase that worry (Cutler & Hodgson, 2001; 
Roberts and Connell, 2000).  Despite having better knowledge of dementia symptoms, causes, 
and risk factors, many people overestimate the heritability of AD (Roberts & Connell, 2000), 
leading to greater fear in adult children of AD patients (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996; 2001; Roberts 
& Connell, 2000).  Furthermore, number of family members with the disease is positively 
correlated with FAD (Cutler & Hodgson, 2001).  Even without a genetic vulnerability to the 
disease, serving as a caregiver to someone with AD appears to increase one’s personal concerns 
about memory impairments (Cantegreil-Kallen & Pin, 2012; Leon et al., 2015). 
Perceived memory abilities also increase one’s level of FAD, with greater frequency of 
SMCs (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996; 2001) or perception of a recent change in memory functioning 
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(Cutler & Hodgson, 2001) associated with more fear.  Among demographic predictors of FAD, 
being married (Cutler & Hodgson, 2001), older (Cutler & Hodgson, 2001; Cantegreil-Kallen & 
Pin, 2012), female (Cantegreil-Kallen & Pin, 2012), having a higher educational or occupational 
level, or being unmarried or female with a living relative diagnosed with AD are associated with 
greater fear (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996; 2001).  FAD has also been linked to overall health beliefs, 
with poorer perceived overall health being associated with greater fear of developing 
Alzheimer’s disease (Cantegreil-Kallen & Pin, 2012). 
FAD represents a barrier to early detection of Alzheimer’s disease or other dementias 
(Corner & Bond, 2004).  Individuals who are fearful of their memory problems may not be able 
to distinguish their everyday memory failures from true indications of decline.  People high in 
personal concern about AD are more likely to seek medical attention for their memory 
complaints (Ramakers et al., 2009), which allows for better screening but greater cost for these 
individuals.  Furthermore, these individuals are likely to use compensatory mnemonic strategies 
(ex. calendars, lists, schedules, memory training games) less often or less effectively than 
individuals with more accurate appraisal of their memory.  If memory decline is seen as 
inevitable and uncontrollable, motivation for early identification, treatment, and preparation may 
be lessened.  Ultimately, anxiety about loss of one’s identity, dignity, or independence might 
cause individuals who are fearful about the etiology of their memory lapses to be less willing to 
ask for help (Corner & Bond, 2004). 
Until recently, FAD was usually measured using a single question, such as “I would like 
to ask how concerned you are about personally developing Alzheimer’s disease.  Would you say 
that you are very concerned, somewhat concerned, not very concerned, or not at all concerned?” 
(Cutler & Hodgson, 1996; Cutler & Hodgson, 2001, p. 338), or very few questions (Roberts & 
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Connell, 2000).  In 2012, French, Floyd, Wilkins, & Osato developed the Fear of Alzheimer’s 
Disease Scale (FADS) as a response to the limited assessment of FAD symptoms in research and 
clinical practice.  The FADS contains three scales – General Fear, Physical Symptoms, and 
Catastrophic Attitude, and it is highly correlated with trait anxiety as measured by the STAI-T 
(French, Floyd, Wilkins & Osato, 2012).  A Korean version of the scale has also been validated, 
with good psychometric properties for the assessment of anticipatory dementia (Moon, Kim, 
Hoi, Oh & Chan, 2014).  This scale should be recognized as the first attempt to measure FAD 
comprehensively, using a psychometrically sound instrument; however, the FADS does not 
assess some important constructs associated with FAD.  Alongside physical, emotional and 
cognitive reactions to thinking about AD, a more comprehensive measure of FAD would also 
assess knowledge of normal vs. AD-impaired memory functioning, knowledge about causes 
(including heritability) and treatments of AD, attitudes towards treatments for AD, beliefs about 
personal susceptibility to AD or quality of life with AD, and self-efficacy in handling an AD 
diagnosis. 
In this study, FAD is conceptualized as developing from a combination of poor 
metacognitive appraisal of one’s abilities, plus limited self-efficacy to change, control, or handle 
an AD diagnosis.  As such, a comprehensive measure of AD must not only ask about one’s 
perceived susceptibility to an AD diagnosis but also one’s perceived ability to handle the 
diagnosis, if one were to be diagnosed.  The Health Belief Model (HBM; Rosenstock et al., 
1988) may provide a social learning theory model through which FAD may be better understood.  
The health belief model is used to understand and predict engagement in health and lifestyle 
behaviors and to assess attitudes about chronic illness. In its most basic form, the HBM asserts 
that perceived threat of a disorder or injury is combined with one’s outcome expectations for 
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trying to address or change risk for the disorder to yield self-efficacy, or one’s perceived ability 
to cope with or change the disorder or injury.  In the case of FAD, the perceived threat of AD 
would arise from beliefs about one’s personal susceptibility to the disorder and beliefs about the 
seriousness of the disorder.  Outcome expectations for AD would arise from beliefs about 
availability and effectiveness of treatment options or preventative lifestyle changes to slow or 
stop the development of AD.  High perceived susceptibility, strong negative beliefs about quality 
of life with AD, and few perceived ways to minimize AD course or severity would lead to lower 
self-efficacy and greater FAD. 
Although it likely represents a distinct construct in its own right, FAD likely shares a 
conceptual overlap with tendency to notice and report everyday memory failures, or SMCs. 
Subjective Memory Complaints 
Subjective memory complaints (SMCs) are everyday complaints about perceived 
memory failures.   The prevalence of memory complaints in healthy, non-demented older adults 
is at least 10% (Jungwirth et al., 2004).  There is some evidence to suggest that SMCs may 
represent subtle functional changes in the brain before objective memory problems develop.  
Indeed, SMCs are among the diagnostic criteria for mild cognitive impairment, according to the 
most recent International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10, 2014).  It is unclear if biological 
risk factors for AD are truly linked to greater subjective memory problems.   Some studies 
conclude that the apolipoprotein E epsilon-4 allele, a major genetic susceptibility marker for AD, 
is associated with increased SMCs (Small et al., 1999), and others negate the association 
between AD biomarkers and SMCs (Buckley et al., 2013).  Studies also question whether SMCs 
truly reflect objective memory deficits.  There is evidence that older adults with poorer general 
intellectual ability or specific memory ability (Small et al., 1999; Balash et al., 2013) or older 
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men with poorer episodic memory functioning (Volz-Sidiropoulou & Gauggel, 2012) report 
more SMCs.  Conversely, correlational and longitudinal studies of healthy older adults suggest 
that objective memory functioning does not predict frequency or severity of SMCs (Jungwirth et 
al., 2004; Ponds, Van Boxtel, & Jolles, 2000; Lenehan, Klekociuk, & Summers, 2012).  England 
Amariglio et al. (2011) have presented evidence that different types of memory complaints may 
be differentially predictive of objective memory abilities, with certain SMCs (ex. difficulty 
following a group conversation, trouble finding one’s way around familiar streets) accounting for 
a greater proportion of variance in objective memory abilities.  Researchers have also questioned 
the ability of SMCs to predict conversion to Alzheimer’s disease.  A prospective study 
conducted with individuals above the age of 75 suggests that SMCs predict AD conversion only 
in individuals high in overall IQ, and that objective memory ability is a stronger, more universal 
predictor of AD conversion in individuals of any intellectual level (Jungwirth et al., 2008). 
There is a large body of evidence suggesting that SMCs may be more influenced by 
affect or personality than actual memory functioning.  Healthy older adults endorsing higher 
levels of anxiety and depression report more frequent or severe memory complaints (Balash et 
al., 2013; Buckley et al., 2013, Jungwirth et al., 2004, Ponds, Van Boxtel, & Jolles, 2000), and 
SMC severity is only associated with age (and not memory ability) in the mildly cognitively 
impaired (Buckley et al., 2013).  Personality traits like neuroticism and negative affect may also 
account for variance in SMCs (Dux et al., 2008; Pearman, 2009; Merema, Speelman, Foster & 
Kaczmarek. 2013).  More specifically, anxiety sensitivity may moderate the relationship between 
subjective and objective memory functioning such that individuals high in anxiety sensitivity 
will report more memory complaints, even in the absence of memory dysfunction (Dux et al., 
2008).  Independent of the influence of mood disorder, higher perceived stress also increases 
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memory complaints (Potter, Hartman, & Ward, 2009).  This finding provides an explanation for 
the relationship between FAD and SMCs; greater FAD and associated worry about future 
healthcare and financial needs, relationships and losses may drive higher stress levels, which 
increases attention to memory functioning and, therefore, memory complaints. 
While SMCs are unstructured private assessments of one’s own personal memory 
functioning, it is unclear if they relate to structured assessments of memory ability or actual 
memory performance.  Metacognitive tasks that require the participant to prospectively estimate 
his or her memory performance on a structured task may have greater objectivity and clinical 
utility. 
Metamemory 
Metacognition is defined as “thoughts, beliefs, and other cognitive processes devoted to 
assessing and controlling one’s own cognitions” (Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011, p. 61).  
Metamemory, an instance of metacognition, includes the cognitive processes related to appraisal 
and direction of one’s memory.  Although SMCs rely somewhat on metacognitive processes, the 
two constructs are not the same.  While SMCs are subjective evaluations of everyday memory 
functioning, such as the failure to remember where one left one’s keys, metamemory is assessed 
using formal and objective prospective and retrospective tasks.  Two such paradigms, the 
Judgment of Learning (JOL) and Feeling of Knowing (FOK) tasks, ask the respondent to 
prospectively evaluate their performance on a memory task during the encoding or retrieval 
stage, respectively.  In a JOL test, the respondent is presented with a stimulus – often word pairs 
or a word list – and must appraise the likelihood that the paired words or a certain number of 
items will be recalled at a later time (Souchay et al., 2013).  In a FOK task, the respondent is 
shown a stimulus (again, either word pairs or a word list), is given an opportunity to recall the 
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associated pair or items, and he or she is then asked to appraise the likelihood of recognizing the 
missed targets at a later time (Souchay et al, 2013).  Through these tasks, researchers are able to 
estimate the accuracy or ‘resolution’ of metacognitive appraisals as well as the confidence with 
which a respondent holds their appraisal. 
Metacognition has also been conceptualized as involving a dual process of monitoring 
and control (Nelson and Narens, 1990 in Souchay et al., 2013).  Metamemory monitoring 
describes the subjective evaluation of memory functioning in different situations.  Metamemory 
control describes the behaviors that are enacted to maximize memory functioning (Souchay et 
al., 2013).  In 1988, Nelson and Leonesio proposed a model of the relationship between these 
two concepts. Known as the ‘monitoring affects control hypothesis,’ this feedback model 
suggests that ongoing appraisal of one’s memory functioning in relation to the task demands of a 
given situation drives one to control one’s memory by guiding thoughts and behaviors and 
implementing compensatory or mnemonic strategies (in Souchay et al., 2013).  Control strategies 
may range from small-scale changes in how a task is approached to significant lifestyle changes 
that might preserve memory functioning.  There is some evidence to suggest that the perceived 
effectiveness of different control strategies changes with age, with younger adults rating task-
specific control strategies (ex. using mnemonic devices) and older adults rating lifestyle changes 
(“use it or lose it” mental exercising) as most effective in improving memory (Hertzog, McGuire, 
Horhota, & Jopp, 2010). 
Metacognitive Monitoring. While some research suggests that healthy older adults 
make accurate estimations of their memory performance, there is considerable individual 
variability in monitoring (Clare, Whitaker, & Nelis, 2010).  Despite age-related changes in 
episodic memory and poorer source memory for encoded information, cognitively-intact older 
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adults appear to have similar FOK (Eakin & Hertzog, 2012) and JOL (Hertzog & Dunlosky, 
2011) resolution to those of younger adults.  Conversely, AD patients’ monitoring of their 
memory is often inaccurate, with most individuals overestimating their abilities and some 
individuals underestimating their abilities (Clare, Whitaker, & Nelis, 2010). 
 Beyond Alzheimer’s dementia and age, a range of factors may impact 
metacognitive resolution.  Metacognitive monitoring accuracy is positively correlated with 
education in both healthy older adults and in older adults with diagnosed AD (Szajer & Murphy, 
2013).  Metacognitive monitoring appraisals are also shaped by social norms and cultural 
expectations.  For instance, older adults from Sardinia, a cultural region known for longevity, are 
more likely to expect memory stability or even improvement than adults from a cultural region 
not known for longevity (e.g. Milanese; Bottiroli, Cavallini, Fastame, & Hertzog, 2013).  The 
older adults from longer-living cultures may provide higher appraisals of their abilities based on 
their societal expectations.  Furthermore, older adults from longer-living societies attribute 
memory stability or improvement throughout old age to a wider range of causes, such as fate, 
heredity, memory ability, memory training, nutrition, others’ opinions, and personal task 
importance (Bottiroli, Cavallini, Fastame, & Hertzog, 2013). 
Metacognitive Control.  Even if monitoring resolution is high and one can identify when 
an item is or is not correctly encoded, control is essential for adapting behavior and cognition 
based on this knowledge.  Without redirection of attention and implementation of strategies for 
poorly learned items, one cannot benefit from improved memory performance.  It appears that, 
unlike metacognitive monitoring, metacognitive control may be impaired in healthy older adults.  
Although older adults can accurately estimate that items presented less frequently at encoding 
will be harder to recall, they cannot use this information to change the strategies by which they 
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learn the items or to identify the source of the items (Kuhlmann & Touron, 2011).  Furthermore, 
while younger and older adults believe (incorrectly) that remembering read paired-associates 
would be easier than remembering generated pairs, younger adults allocate study time based on 
these ratings, while older adults do not (Froger et al., 2011). 
Despite poor control abilities, researchers and clinicians can take advantage of spared 
monitoring and belief in the efficacy of memory training to instruct older adults in better 
compensatory strategies for declining memory.  For instance, older adults can be taught to test 
their memory appraisals against actual performance immediately after learning, and to allocate 
further study time to items failed during self-test (Bailey, Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2010).  Training 
on self-testing and study allocation is more effective than traditional strategies encouraged 
during learning, such as building of semantic or imagery mnemonics (Dunlosky, Kubat-Silman, 
& Hertzog, 2003; Bailey, Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2010).  These training strategies may be critical 
for improving older adults metamemory, objective memory functioning and, ultimately, their 
ability to continue to live independently. 
Study Summary 
Despite the increased prevalence of AD and memory concerns more broadly, the 
relationship between metacognitive evaluations of memory functioning and objective memory 
performance has not been widely studied.  It is also unclear how FAD might impact the 
relationship between perceived and actual memory performance.  Furthermore, FAD has 
undergone limited validation as a construct related to but distinct from everyday SMCs or 
metacognitive monitoring and control.  Last, research has not elucidated the impact of FAD on 
the monitoring-control process that appears to be important for adaptation to cognitive changes 
in late life.   More specifically, it is not known whether having high FAD might interfere with 
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accurate monitoring of learning and retrieval or may interrupt one’s ability and motivation to put 
into place effective compensatory control strategies.  The current study aimed to address the 
above gaps in the literature by developing a novel measure of FAD that would tap into a more 
comprehensive set of domains than previous measures.  This measure has the potential to be of 
considerable clinical utility.  In addition, such a short questionnaire might be integrated into a 
larger psychological or cognitive battery or given by a primary care provider to assist with 
identifying older adults at risk for anxiety disorders.  This study also aimed to understand the 
relationships between FAD, other metacognitive measures, and objective memory functioning.  
By understanding the relative amount of variance in objective memory abilities in healthy adults 
accounted for by SMCs, metacognitive appraisal of learning on a specific task, and FAD, 
researchers and clinicians may be able to characterize the nature of normal age-related memory 
changes more effectively.  The current study also investigated the extent to which FAD impacts 
memory monitoring and the execution of compensatory control behaviors when memory is 
perceived as failing.  This goal is critical from an intervention standpoint.  Understanding these 
relationships will allow researchers to identify individuals who are more likely to use 
compensatory study or memory aids, to seek treatment for their memory complaints, and to 
successfully identify when their memory failures put them in dangerous situations.  Conversely, 
the research will also allow for identification of older adults who may under- or over-estimate 
their memory abilities and may fail to implement strategies or seek treatments appropriately.  
This latter group of individuals may also prove to be more vulnerable to anxiety, depression, or a 
failure to pursue an engaged lifestyle.  The study findings may allow researchers to identify those 
individuals who would be most at risk for these disorders, who are most likely to benefit from 
psycho-education about normal memory aging and training on metacognitive control strategies. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
The following method was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board of 
Wayne State University and the Institute of Gerontology Healthier Black Elders Review Board. 
Participant Recruitment 
A power analysis was used to calculate the number of participants required to achieve 
adequate power for the analyses used in the current study.  For bivariate correlations, assuming a 
power level of .80, one-tailed α = .0042 (Bonferroni-adjusted for multiple comparisons), and a 
predicted small to moderate r effect size of 0.35, the required sample size per group would be n = 
93.  For multiple regression, assuming a power level of .80, α = .00625 (Bonferroni-adjusted for 
multiple comparisons), a predicted small to moderate R2 effect size of 0.25 and a maximum of 
ten predictors, the required sample size per group would be n = 85.  The study therefore recruited 
94 participants to ensure adequate power to detect group differences.   
Participants were recruited from multiple sources.  A large proportion of participants 
were recruited through the participant research pool of the Healthier Black Elders (HBE) 
organization at the Wayne State University Institute of Gerontology (WSU IOG).  The HBE is a 
group of professionals and volunteers from the Detroit area dedicated to advancing the health of 
older African-Americans through research, education, and healthcare initiatives.  Part of the 
HBE’s mission involves encouraging African-American older adults to participate in research.  
As such, the HBE maintains a list of Detroit-area residents interested in participating in approved 
research studies.  The current study utilized a subset of this list based on inclusion/exclusion 
criteria to identify potential participants.  The study was also advertised through short 
presentations at local community talks geared towards older adult health, flyers distributed in 
local public libraries, communities of faith, exercise groups, and senior centers, and through 
19  
 
word of mouth. 
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
In an attempt to maximize the range of scores on the FADS and other FAD measures, 
researchers recruited an approximately equal number of individuals with and without a family 
history of Alzheimer’s disease or other dementia.  Family history positive participants were 
defined as having at least one blood relative with dementia diagnosed by a medical professional; 
cases who listed family members they believed to have dementia were not counted in the family 
history positive group. 
Although participants were permitted to report SMCs, individuals who had been 
previously diagnosed with Mild Cognitive Impairment, dementia, or another memory disorder 
were excluded from the study.  Given the focus of the study on metacognition, self-monitoring, 
and personal concern about susceptibility to AD, individuals who had previously ruled out 
dementia or AD through a clinical evaluation were also excluded from the study.  All 
participants were living independently in the community.  
Additional exclusion criteria included a history of significant neurological problems (i.e., 
stroke, head injury with loss of consciousness as an adult, seizures, or other neurological 
condition), current psychiatric disorder for which the individual is taking medication, or 
uncorrected visual or hearing impairments.  
Sample Characteristics 
Participants included 93 community-living individuals.  Sample characteristics are 
summarized in Table 1.  The majority of participants were female (75.30%) and the average age 
of the participants was 70.18 years.  Most participants were retired, though 18.30% are currently 
working part-time and 9.70% are currently working full-time.  Approximately 44% of the sample 
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was Caucasian and 49% was African-American.  The average education of the participants was 
approximately 15 years.  53.80% of the participants denied a family history of dementia.  
46.20% of the participants acknowledged a history of dementia or Alzheimer’s disease in at least 
one blood relative.  24.70% also endorsed a history of caregiving, either professionally or 
personally, for someone with Alzheimer’s disease or dementia. 
The sample was also stratified by family history of dementia.   Groups were compared 
via independent samples t-tests or chi-squared tests of significance to determine whether they 
differed in terms of demographic characteristics.  Groups were not significantly different in 
terms of age (t(90) = 1.18, p = .241, Cohen’s d = 0.244) or education (t(90) = 0.024, p = .982, 
Cohen’s d = -0.004).  Groups were also not significantly different in terms of gender (χ2(1) = 
0.40, p = .627, Cramer’s V = 0.065), race (χ2(3) = 1.84, p = .796), or employment status (Fisher’s 
Exact(2) = 3.05, p = .211, Cramer’s V = 0.186). 
Measures  
Baseline Cognitive Functioning.  In order to assess whether groups were equivalent in 
baseline intellectual functioning, all participants completed the Salthouse Synonym and 
Antonym Vocabulary tests and the Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status.   
The Salthouse Synonym and Antonym Vocabulary Test (Salthouse, 1993).  The 
Salthouse Synonym Vocabulary Test includes ten uncommon words.  The respondent must 
choose the best synonym for each word from five provided options.  The Salthouse Antonym 
Vocabulary Test (Salthouse, 1993) includes ten different words, to which respondents must 
match the best antonym from five options.  The score for each test is the number of items 
answered correctly.  The range in scores on the combination of the tests is 0 to 20, with higher 
scores denoting greater verbal abilities.  The Synonym and Antonym vocabulary test has been 
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used as a proxy measure of general cognitive functioning, as verbal abilities are strongly 
correlated with overall IQ (Bowles & Salthouse, 2008).      
Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status (TICS; Brandt & Folstein) – the TICS is a 
standardized measure of general cognitive ability designed to be given in situations in which 
face-to-face assessment would be impossible or inefficient.  The measure includes eleven items 
that are summed to yield a total ability score.  Test developers have suggested that the TICS 
correlates strongly with the MMSE and its scores have demonstrated high test-retest reliability 
for the detection of cognitive impairment in older adults age 60 to 98 years.  Further studies of 
the psychometric properties of the TICS and the TICS-Modified have suggested that TICS scores 
validly assess cognitive functioning in Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias (Duff, Dennett, 
& Tometich, 2012) as well as amnestic mild cognitive impairment (Cook, Marsiske, & McCoy, 
2009).  Furthermore, TICS scores correlate highly with scores from several indices from a 
comprehensive neuropsychological assessment, including verbal memory (Rey Auditory Verbal 
Learning Test), orientation and mental tracking, fluency (category and animal naming), abstract 
reasoning (Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices), and attention and executive functioning 
(Stroop Color-Word Test, Trail-Making Test), and working memory (WAIS-III Digit Span 
subtest; van den Berg, Ruis, Biessels, Kappelle, & van Zandvoort, 2012).  
Negative Affect.  Negative affect, including general anxiety and depression, was 
assessed using multiple measures.  
Geriatric Depression Scale - Short Form (GDS-SF; Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986).  The 
short form of the GDS contains 15 phrases relating to symptoms of depression that older adults 
might have.  The respondent is required to respond either “yes” or “no” based on whether the 
phrase describes how they have been feeling during the week prior to the assessment.  Scores on 
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the GDS-SF range from 0 to 15, with a score equal to or greater than five suggesting the 
presence of depression.  The short form of the GDS has been shown to have roughly equivalent 
specificity and sensitivity in the diagnosis of depression in older adults as compared to the long 
form of the GDS (Lesher & Berryhill, 1994).  Older adults’ scores on the long and short version 
of the GDS are also strongly correlated (r = .66, p < .01; Alden, Austin & Sturgeon, 1989). 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults (STAI-Y; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 
Vagg & Jacobs, 1983).  The STAI-Y is a measure of self-reported anxiety symptoms.  The 
STAI-Y is divided into two subscales: State and Trait.  The STAI-State subscale measures 
anxious feelings at the time of the assessment.  The STAI-Trait subscale measures chronic 
anxious symptoms present across situations.  The measure is often used to distinguish anxious 
symptoms from depressed symptoms or to differentiate situational anxiety from trait level 
anxiety.    
The STAI-Y consists of two sets of 20 statements, with one set asking the respondent 
about current symptoms (STAI-Y1; ex. “I feel calm.”) and a second set asking the respondent 
about general symptoms (STAI-Y2; ex. “I am “calm, cool, and collected”.”).  The respondent 
scores each item on a four-point Likert-style scale, with 1 = “Almost Always” and 4 = “Almost 
Never.”  The scores possible on each subscale range from 20 to 80, with higher scores denoting 
greater anxiety. 
Scores from the STAI-Y have demonstrated reliability and validity for the assessment of 
trait and state anxiety in older adults.  The test-retest reliability for STAI-Y scores may range 
from 0.31 to 0.86 using intervals of one to 104 days (Julian, 2011).  As one might expect, the 
test-retest reliability for the state anxiety subscale of the STAI is much lower than for the trait 
anxiety subscale. Although little is known about the internal consistency of STAI scores when 
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used with older adults, previous research has shown that the STAI alpha coefficients may range 
from 0.86 for high school students to 0.95 for military recruits (Julian, 2011). STAI-Y scores 
have also been shown to share strong correlations with other measures of anxiety, indicating that 
it has construct validity (Julian, 2011).  Recently, STAI-Y scores have demonstrated strong 
reliability and validity for the assessment of state (Potvin et al., 2011) and trait (Bergua et al., 
2012) anxiety in adults over the age of 65 years. 
Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease.  To assess each participant’s level of anticipatory 
dementia and to validate the construct itself, several measures were used, including a novel 
measure aimed to tap into the broader construct of FAD. 
Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease Scale (FADS; French, Floyd, Wilkins & Osato, 2011).  
The FADS is a self-report measure that taps into three facets of FAD: general fear, physiological 
symptoms accompanying FAD, and catastrophic attitudes associated with FAD. Scores from the 
scale have been validated for the assessment of these facets of anticipatory dementia in adults 
age 65 to 91 (French et al., 2011).  It includes 30 statements to which respondents indicate their 
level of agreement on a five-point Likert-style scale ranging from “never” to “always.”  Higher 
scores on the scale denote greater fear of developing Alzheimer’s disease.  Scores from the 
General Fear, Physical Symptoms, and Catastrophic Attitudes factors had Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients of .94, .87, and .80, respectively, in adults over age 65 years.  The overall internal 
consistency coefficient of scores from the measure was .91, indicating acceptable reliability for 
research and clinical use in this context (French, 2011). FADS scores also demonstrated 
excellent construct validity and showed correlations with the total score on the STAI. However, 
stronger correlations were observed with the STAI trait subscale score (French, 2011).   
Cutler & Hodgson (2001) Single Item Assessment.  Previous studies have measured 
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FAD using a single question.  In order to assess construct validity, the following item was also 
asked: “I would like to ask how concerned you are about personally developing Alzheimer’s 
disease.  Would you say that you are very concerned, somewhat concerned, not very concerned, 
or not at all concerned?” Although the reliability of this single-item measure cannot be assessed, 
responses to the question have shown validity in the assessment of older adults’ personal 
concerns about AD.  Cutler and Hodgson (2001) suggest that there is significant shared variance 
between worries about memory functioning, family history of AD, and FAD development. 
Anticipatory Dementia Inventory (ADI). – The ADI is a novel measure of FAD designed 
for the purpose of this study. The ADI includes 50 statements regarding six different facets of 
FAD, each of which maps onto a part of the HBM (see Figure 1).  Personal susceptibility is 
measured by (1) beliefs about normal vs. AD-related forgetting, (2) beliefs about the prevalence 
and etiology of AD, and (3) beliefs about personal likelihood of developing the disorder.  
Perceived seriousness of AD is assessed in terms of (4) immediate consequences (the physical 
and emotional symptoms experienced when thinking about AD), and (5) specific fears about AD 
sequelae (e.g., loss of independence, loss of relationships, physical pain).  Outcome expectations 
about AD will be assessed in statements related to (6) beliefs about availability and efficacy of 
treatments/preventative lifestyle changes to slow or stop AD progression.  Respondents rate each 
of the items for agreement on a five-point Likert-style scale.  0 = “strongly disagree”, 1 = 
“somewhat disagree”, 2 = “neutral – do not agree or disagree”, 3 = “somewhat agree”, and 4 = 
“strongly agree.”  Higher scores on the ADI denote greater anticipatory dementia or fear of 
Alzheimer’s disease.  The measure is included in Appendix A. 
Subjective Memory Complaints.  Self-reported memory difficulties were assessed using 
the Memory Functioning Questionnaire. 
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Memory Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ; Gilewski, Zelinski, & Schaie, 1990).  The 
MFQ is a self-report measure used to assess how respondents perceive the frequency and 
severity of their memory problems, as well as compensatory strategies.  The present study will 
utilize only the General Frequency of Forgetting scale (Frequency).  The Frequency scale asks 
the respondent to rate how often they have difficulty remembering types of information (ex. 
names, faces, appointments).  Each item is rated on a 7-point scale, with 1 = “Always” and 7 = 
Never.”  Scores on the MFQ Frequency scale range from 18 to 126, with lower scores suggesting 
greater frequency of perceived memory failures. 
Gilewski, Zelinski and Schaie (1990) have found evidence that the four subscales of the 
MFQ, including the General Frequency of Forgetting scale, are a valid assessment of perceived 
memory functioning in adults age 16 to 89.  The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for scores from the 
Frequency subscale, in particular, is .94, suggesting high reliability (Gilewski, Zelinski, and 
Schaie, 1990). 
Objective Memory Functioning and Metamemory.  Objective memory functioning 
was assessed using a verbal list-learning task.  The lists used in the current task were drawn from 
a prior study of verbal learning and recall (Woodard, 1991; see Appendix B). These 20-word 
lists were selected because items on the lists were matched for item difficulty, syllable length, 
and semantic and phonemic relatedness.  The length of the word list was chosen to reduce the 
likelihood of ceiling effects and provide a task sufficiently challenging to encourage purposeful 
use of memory strategies by participants.   
Words are presented visually using E-prime ®, Version 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, 
Inc.).  All words were presented in large Arial font, in the center of the screen.  Computer 
conditions were regulated to maximize reliability of word presentation across participants; a 
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dedicated laptop (2015 HP 15-f133wm with Intel Celeron N2840 Processor, 4GB Memory, 
500GB Hard Drive, 15.6-inch screen diameter, Windows version 8.1), devoid of self-updating 
programs, the Internet, or anti-virus software that may interfere with task presentation or data 
recording, was used.  Due to varying participant height, the angle of the computer was not 
standard; instead, efforts were made to have all participants seated comfortably, with the 
computer placed 18 to 24 inches away and the screen faced directly at them.  Participants were 
seated away from windows to reduce screen glare. All instructions were provided visually and 
read to the participant, verbatim. 
Condition 1: Computer-Paced Memory and JOL Task.  In the computer-paced 
condition, 20 words are presented at a standard pace.  The examiner begins by explaining that 20 
words will be presented visually at a rate of one word every two seconds, and that the participant 
must try to remember as many words as possible so that he or she can recall them, in any order, 
after the list is presented.  Prior to the list presentation, the examiner asks for an initial judgment 
of learning estimate to determine the participant’s rating of their memory without behavioral 
feedback.  The list is then presented at the center of the computer screen.  Directly after the final 
word has been presented, the examiner asks for a judgment of learning estimate from the 
participant (“Of the 20 words you just saw, how many do you think you can remember now?”).  
As soon as the participant has given a JOL appraisal, the examiner prompts the participant to 
recall, out loud, as many of the words he or she can remember in any order.  The participant is 
allowed up to 60 seconds to recall as many words as possible, with no corrections for repetition 
or feedback about accuracy.  After completion of the recall trial, the participant completes two 
more repetitions of the above procedure for a total of three trials.  The resulting data provides 
four JOL estimates and accuracy across trials, as well as information about learning and memory. 
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Condition 2: Self-Paced Memory and JOL Task. In the self-paced list-learning 
condition, participants can vary the amount of time that they use to study the list of 20 words in 
order to maximize the number of words recalled.   In the present study, metacognitive control is 
operationalized as amount of study time allocated to each item.  The procedure for the self-paced 
condition mirrors the procedure in the computer-paced condition, with the exception of how 
word lists are paced. When the list is presented, the participant is given up to 10-seconds to study 
each word on the list, but can press a key to manually move on to the next word at any time.  The 
participant can therefore shorten or lengthen their study time based on their assessment of task 
difficulty and memory ability.  As in the computer-paced task, participants complete one JOL 
estimate prior to list presentation, then three presentation and recall trials, making a JOL estimate 
after each list presentation and before each 60-second recall trial.   
Procedure 
All interested individuals underwent a telephone screening to determine their eligibility 
for the study.  Prior to this screen, participants provided verbal consent for recording of their 
responses.  During the phone screen, participants were asked questions about their health and 
given the Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status to assess whether they were cognitively 
intact.  Those individuals who met criteria for participation in the study were also asked to 
complete Cutler and Hodgson’s single-item question about their level of FAD.  Participants in 
the study were scheduled for an hour-and-a-half appointment to participate individually or in 
pairs.  Testing was completed at the WSU research laboratory, the WSU IOG, or at a public 
library of their choice.  All testing at public libraries was completed in private study rooms.  
Efforts were made to complete testing in only quiet, noise-controlled environments with 
adequate lighting to minimize computer glare.  All individuals were asked to provide informed 
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consent before participation.  
Questionnaires and Measures. Participants completed the Salthouse Synonym and 
Antonym Vocabulary tests, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, the MFQ Frequency Subscale, the 
FADS, and the ADI separately from the objective memory and metacognitive monitoring and 
control tasks.  
It was thought that participants might be more anxious about their memory functioning 
after completing the questionnaires about memory concerns and fear of developing AD.  This 
anxiety was expected to drive poorer performance on recall trials and underestimated or unusual 
JOL appraisals.  Similarly, it was suggested that participants who had just undergone challenging 
memory tasks would over-estimate their concern about AD or memory-related worry.  In order 
to control for the possibility of sensitization by task order, the order of the questionnaires and 
memory tasks was counter-balanced, with participants randomly assigned to receive either the 
questionnaires or the memory task first. 
For participants with visual impairments, questionnaires with small print were read aloud 
by the examiner.  The total time for participation was between 45 and 90 minutes.  Participants 










CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS 
Specific Aim 1 
To validate FAD as a construct, the relationship between FAD and related constructs was 
assessed.  First, independent samples t-tests were calculated to determine whether group 
differences exist on FAD measures based on family history.  As data regarding caregiving was 
also available, FAD measure group means were also compared for individuals who had and had 
not reported a history of caregiving for someone with dementia.  Pearson’s r and Kendall’s Tau-
b correlations were computed to determine the relationship between FAD measures and the MFQ 
Frequency Subscale (subjective memory complaints; hypothesis b) and the STAI-State, STAI-
Trait, and GDS scales (general negative affect; hypothesis c).  To assess the relationship between 
FAD and metacognitive monitoring (hypothesis d), Pearson’s r or Kendall’s Tau-b correlations 
were calculated between FAD and JOL estimate score across all list-learning trials.  A 
Bonferroni correction for familywise error was implemented.   
Multiple regression was used to address hypothesis (e) of Specific Aim 1 – that negative 
affect, SMCs, and metacognitive monitoring account for a relatively small amount of variance in 
FAD.  FAD was regressed onto STAI-State and Trait subscales, GDS, MFQ Frequency of 
Forgetting score, and JOL estimate summary scores simultaneously.   The amount of variance 
unaccounted for (1-R2) reflects the amount of residual variance in FAD not explained by other 
factors. 
To address the final hypothesis (f) of Specific Aim 1, the Anticipatory Dementia 
Checklist (ADI) will be developed and analyzed.  As previously mentioned, the ADI was 
developed to assess facets of FAD that map onto the Health Belief Model (HBM; Rosenstock, 
Stretcher and Becker, 1988) including beliefs about general and personal susceptibility to AD, 
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health and AD-specific locus of control, and knowledge about preventative and prescriptive 
treatments for AD.  An initial pool of 50 questions was created by developing AD-specific items 
related to each component of the HBM (perceived susceptibility to AD, perceived seriousness of 
having AD, perceived barriers and benefits to taking action against AD development; see Figure 
1).  Items were created on a Likert-style bipolar scale, ranging from “Strongly Agree” to 
“Strongly Disagree.” 
To assess construct validity, the correlations shared between different measures of FAD 
(Cutler & Hodgson single item question, FADS and ADI) were determined. Kendall’s Tau-b 
correlations were calculated for all analyses involving the Cutler and Hodgson single item.  
Pearson’s r correlations were computed for all other associations.   
Although comprehensive scale validation is not possible with this limited sample size, 
scale validation procedures were used to make initial estimates of the ADI’s internal consistency 
and factor structure.  Cronbach’s alpha was calculated to determine the internal consistency of 
the scale items.  A principal components analysis was used to determine the independent facets 
of FAD assessed by the ADI.  Item factor loadings were qualitatively and quantitatively 
reviewed to characterize each significant component. 
Specific Aim 2 
The second specific aim focuses on understanding which of the metacognitive variables 
utilized in this study might account for significant proportions of variance in objective memory 
functioning.  To address hypotheses (a) and (b) of Specific Aim 2, Kendall’s Tau-b and 
Pearson’s r correlations were calculated between total number of items recalled across all self-
paced list-learning trials and each of the metacognitive variables: MFQ-Frequency subscale 
scores (SMCs), FADS, ADI and Cutler & Hodgson’s single item scores (FAD), JOL estimate 
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summary score (metacognitive monitoring), and study time differences between computer-paced 
versus self-paced tasks (metacognitive control). A Bonferroni correction for family-wise error 
was implemented. 
To address hypothesis (c) of Specific Aim 2, the relative proportion of variance in 
objective memory functioning accounted for by each of the metacognitive variables was assessed 
using multiple regression.  Two regression equations were created to explain composite memory 
scores across all self-paced trials and computer-paced trials, separately.  MFQ-Frequency 
subscale scores, FADS, ADI and Cutler & Hodgson’s single item scores, JOL estimate summary 
score, and study time differences between computer- versus self-paced tasks were entered 
simultaneously.  The squared semi-partial correlations of each predictor were evaluated to 
determine the relative unique contributions of each metacognitive variable to the overall model. 
Specific Aim 3 
The final objective of the study aimed to investigate the relationship between FAD and 
metacognitive monitoring and control.  First, metacognitive monitoring was compared to 
metacognitive control through calculation of Pearson’s r correlations between JOL estimates 
from self-paced tasks and study time on subsequent trials (Hypothesis a).  Kendall’s Tau-b and 
Pearson’s r correlations were calculated to estimate the relationship between FAD measures 
(FADS, ADI, and the Cutler & Hodgson single item) and metacognitive monitoring accuracy 
(the absolute value of JOL resolution).  Kendall’s Tau-b and Pearson’s r correlations were also 
calculated to estimate the relationship between FAD measures and metacognitive control 
(average study time difference for computer-paced versus self-paced trials).  Again, a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons was implemented to correct for the proposed comparisons.  
To address hypotheses (b) and (c) of Specific Aim 3, a continuous x continuous 
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moderated multiple regression analysis was planned.  A moderated multiple regression was to be 
estimated for each of the measures of FAD.  To assess whether the FADS scores moderates the 
relationship between JOL estimates and study time changes, JOL estimate summary scores 
across all trials and the interaction between JOL estimate and FADS were to be entered into a 
regression equation to predict average study time difference between computer- and self-paced 




















CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
All analyses were performed using SPSS Version 22.0 (IBM Corporation, 2013). 
Data Screening 
Minimum and maximum values for each variable were assessed to ensure data entry 
accuracy.  A missing value analysis was completed using SPSS.  All variables had less than or 
equal to five percent missing data with the exception of the Memory Functioning Questionnaire, 
General Memory Estimate (Question 1: “How would you rate your memory in terms of the kinds 
of problems you have?”, 11.8% missing data), FADS Item 16 (“My hands become clammy when 
I think about getting Alzheimer’s disease”; 6.5% missing data), and the Cutler & Hodgson FAD 
Question (63.4% missing data).  Due to the high proportion of missing data, which appeared to 
occur because of a misprint in test packets, the Cutler and Hodgson FAD question was removed 
from further analyses.  Cases with and without missing data on these variables were dummy 
coded and compared to assess for patterns of missing data.  No patterns emerged from these 
analyses; therefore, data were determined to be missing at random.  Rather, observations of 
participants’ files suggest that items were skipped because of their placement on questionnaire 
pages or because of difficulty reading the item. 
Frequency tables were created for each variable to assess the distribution of the data.  To 
determine whether univariate outliers existed in the dataset, all continuous variables were 
converted into z-scores and compared against a cutoff of z ± 3.29, which reflects an alpha level 
of α = .001.  Two univariate outliers were detected: a single outlier for computer-paced JOL 
resolution (Case #208; z = 3.31), and a single outlier for self-paced JOL resolution (Case #110; z 
= -3.69).  No other univariate outliers were detected in the dataset.  In order to assess for the 
presence of multivariate outliers, the 14 outcome variables of interest were entered into a 
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regression to calculate Mahalanobis’ distance.  Using a chi-squared cut-off of χ2(13) = 36.123 
consistent with an alpha level of α = .001, only two multivariate outliers were detected: Case 
#233 (Mahalanobis’ distance = 53.685), and Case 150 (Mahalanobis’ distance = 39.262).  Given 
the limited number of univariate and multivariate outliers, it was not considered necessary to 
perform a discriminant function analysis to assess differences in these cases.  Cases were 
inspected individually to determine if they possessed unique characteristics compared to the rest 
of the data; they were demographically similar to other cases. 
The outcome variables of interest were also assessed for normality.  The distribution of 
data for each variable was evaluated visually using Q-Q plots.  The skewness and kurtosis index 
of each variable was also calculated.  Variables were classified as not skewed, moderately 
skewed, substantially skewed, and not kurtotic, moderately kurtotic, and substantially kurtotic 
using this information (see Table 2). Although some variables were significantly skewed or 
kurtotic, these measures represent phenomena that are not expected to be normally distributed in 
the population; therefore, no transformation was completed to adjust these variables. 
Demographically Corrected Outcome Measures 
Age was not significantly associated with measures of FAD.  It was not significantly 
associated with scores on the measures of negative affect.  Age was associated with objective 
memory performance, as evidenced by significant correlations between age and Trial 1 score 
(r(90) = -.414, p < .001), Trial 2 score (r(90) = -.451, p < .001), Trial 3 score (r(90) = -.389, p < .001) 
and total score (r(90) = -.468, p < .001) in the computer-paced condition and Trial 1 score (r(90) = -
.221 , p = .035), Trial 2 score (r(90) = -.309 , p = .003), Trial 3 score (r(90) = -.316, p = .002) and 
total score (r(90) = -.311, p = .003) in the self-paced condition.  Interestingly, age was associated 
with accuracy of the JOL estimate (resolution) on computer-paced Trial 1 (r(90) = -.212, p = 
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.042), computer-paced Trial 2 (r(90) = -.245, p = .019), and across computer-paced trials (r(90) = -
.219, p = .036), but was not associated with JOL resolution on any self-paced trials. 
Education did not share a significant relationship with any measures of FAD or negative 
affect.  Education was significantly associated with performance on self-paced Trial 1 (r(90) = 
.260, p = .012), Trial 2 (r(90) = .270, p = .009), and Trial 3 (r(90) = .311, p = .003), and across self-
paced trials (r(90) = .302, p = .003), but was not associated with objective memory functioning in 
the computer-paced trial.  Education was also significantly associated with the JOL estimate on 
self-paced Trial 2 (r(90) = .223, p = .032) and Trial 3 (r(90) = .205, p = .049).  Education shared a 
significant relationship with JOL resolution on computer-paced Trial 1 (r(90) = .215, p = .039) 
and overall  (r(90) = .209, p = .045).  Finally, education was significantly associated with the 
difference in number of items recalled on self-paced Trial 2 compared to computer-paced Trial 2 
(r(90) = .222, p = .033).  Similarly, education was significantly associated with the difference in 
self-paced Trial 3 score versus computer-paced Trial 3 score (r(90) = .312, p = .002), and overall 
difference between self- and computer-paced task scores (r(90) = .298, p = .039). 
Given that age and education were correlated with the many of the outcome measures of 
interest in the study, demographically corrected scores were computed.  This correction was 
accomplished by regressing the outcome measures onto age and education and saving the 
resulting standardized residuals.  These demographically corrected scores were used in 
subsequent analyses. 
Specific Aim (1)  
Individuals with and without a family history of dementia do not differ on FAD 
(Hypothesis a). Independent samples t-tests revealed that there were no significant difference 
between individuals with or without family history of dementia on FADS score (t(89) = -1.29, p = 
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.201, Cohen’s d = 0.28) or ADI score (t(89) = -0.61, p = .546, Cohen’s d = 0.13).  No significant 
differences existed between individuals with and without history of caregiving for someone with 
dementia on the FADS score (t(89) = -0.80, p = .425, Cohen’s d = 0.17) or ADI score (t(89) = -
0.97, p = .337, Cohen’s d = 0.21, ES = .10).  Results are summarized in Table 3. 
Higher FAD is associated with more subjective memory complaints (Hypothesis b). 
Pearson’s r correlations were calculated to determine the relationship between measures of FAD 
and subjective memory complaints (MFQ total score).  Given that two comparisons were 
calculated to address this hypothesis, a Bonferroni correction for family-wise error was 
implemented, resulting in a significance level of α = 2.50E-2. Scores on the FADS were 
significantly negatively associated with self-reported quality of memory on the MFQ (r(88) = -.44, 
p < .001).  Scores on the ADI were also significantly negatively associated with MFQ total 
scores (r(88) = -.33, p = .002).  Results are summarized in Table 4. 
FAD is positively associated with depressive symptoms and trait anxiety (Hypothesis 
c).  Pearson’s r correlations were calculated to determine the relationship between measures of 
FAD and Anxiety (STAI-State and STAI-Trait, GDS total score).  Given that eight comparisons 
were calculated to address this hypothesis, a Bonferroni correction for family-wise error was 
implemented, resulting in a significance level of α = 6.25E-3.  Both the FADS score and the ADI 
score were significantly positively associated with State Anxiety at the α = .05 level, but not at 
the Bonferroni-corrected level of significance.  FADS score was significantly associated with 
Trait Anxiety at the α = .05 level, but not at the Bonferroni-corrected level of significance; 
however, scores on the ADI shared a significant positive relationship with Trait Anxiety at this 
corrected level (r(88) = .248, p = .002).  Finally, both the FADS (r(88) = .214, p = .003) and the 
ADI (r(88) = .287, p < .001) were positively associated with depressive symptoms.  These 
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findings are also included in Table 4. 
FAD is not associated with metacognitive monitoring or resolution (Hypothesis d).  
Pearson’s r correlations were calculated to determine the relationship between measures of FAD 
versus JOL estimates and resolution (see Tables 5 and 6).  A Bonferroni correction was used to 
account for the 32 total comparisons made to address this hypothesis, resulting in a significance 
level of p < 1.56E-3.  No measures of FAD were significantly related to any JOL estimate or the 
resolution of any JOL estimate on computer- or self-paced trials.  These findings do not differ 
when examining family history positive and family history negative groups in isolation. 
Subjective memory complaints, negative affect, and metacognitive monitoring 
account for a relatively small amount of variance in FAD (Hypothesis e).  Because 
correlations indicated no significant relationship between measures of FAD and JOL appraisals 
or accuracy, metacognitive monitoring variables were excluded from analyses for this 
hypothesis. Separate multiple regression equations were calculated for the FADS and ADI score, 
entering MFQ total score, GDS score, STAI State and STAI Trait subscale scores 
simultaneously.  1-R2 was used to assess the amount of residual variance in the FAD measure 
unaccounted for by other measures of anticipatory dementia.  Subjective memory complaints and 
negative affect accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in FADS scores (R2 = .269, 
F(4) = 7.83, p < .001), but 73.1% of the variance in FADS scores was not accounted for by these 
predictors.  Similarly, subjective memory complaints and negative affect accounted for a 
significant proportion of the variance in ADI scores (R2 = .273, F(4) = 7.97, p < .001), but 72.7% 
of the variance in ADI scores was not accounted for by these predictors.   
The ADI is related to other measures of FAD, but it also taps into other aspects of 
Alzheimer’s disease fear not measured by existing instruments (Hypothesis f). First, a 
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Pearson’s r correlation was calculated to assess the relationship between the ADI and the FADS. 
The ADI was significantly positively associated with the FADS score at the Bonferroni-corrected 
level of significance (r(86) = .697, p < .001).  The FADS score accounted for 48.6% of the 
variance in the ADI score, but approximately 51.4% of variance in the ADI score was unique. 
Internal consistency of ADI scores was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha.  Cronbach’s 
alpha of the scale was α = .896, indicating a level of reliability adequate for both clinical and 
experimental use.  An assessment of the Cronbach’s alpha with item deletion indicated that 
reliability of the scale would not significantly differ with deletion of any single item. 
 For the purpose of exploring the potential components in the scale for future directions, a 
principal components analysis (PCA) using an orthogonal Varimax rotation was conducted.  An 
initial assessment of the extractions showed that all components were significantly associated, 
with no extraction residuals <.512.  Using an eigenvalue of greater or equal to 1 as cutoff for 
significance, 14 components were extracted.  This solution would account for 75.35% of the 
variance in the measure.  The 14-component solution resulted in 15% (194) residuals with 
absolute values greater than .05, indicating that this solution may not adequately capture the 
variance in the measure. Alternatively, a visual examination of the scree plot for the PCA (see 
Figure 2), indicate that a five-component solution may be more appropriate.  This solution 
accounts for 47.87% of the variance in the measure.  A parallel analysis was completed to 
determine the number of components to retain, based on the method suggested by O’Connor 
(2000).  Parallel analysis uses the current study’s sample size, number of variables in the PCA, 
and other parameters set by the researcher to calculate eigenvalues from randomly generated 
correlation matrices.  These generated values were then compared to eigenvalues of the 
components extracted in the principal components analysis detailed above.  The number of 
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components retained from the PCA are those components with eigenvalues greater than the 
corresponding random eigenvalues.   Based on this method, a total of six factors should be 
retained for further analysis.  This solution accounts for 52.48% of variance in the ADI.  These 
data are summarized in Table 7. 
A qualitative analysis was performed to determine the content of each potential 
component (see Table 8).  The first component is related to overall negative affect at the thought 
of developing AD (e.g., “Thinking about getting AD makes me feel angry.”), as well as specific 
worries about AD (e.g., “I worry that I will be a burden on my family if I develop AD.”).  The 
second component relates to physical symptoms associated with fear of AD (e.g., “When I think 
about AD, my stomach is in knots or I feel nauseated.”).  The third component appears to assess 
the belief in efficacy of treatments for AD (e.g., “If I am diagnosed with AD, there is nothing 
doctors will be able to do to improve my outcomes.”).  The fourth component appears to tap into 
belief in personal vulnerability to AD (e.g., “I believe that I am going to develop AD.”).  The 
fifth component appears to assess beliefs in self-efficacy in reducing the likelihood of developing 
AD (e.g., “I can reduce my chances of developing AD by using my brain in new ways, like doing 
crossword puzzles, Sudoku, or reading.”).  Items in the final component tap into resilience to 
worry about AD (“Thinking about AD does not make me worry.”).  Other components were less 
defined.   
Specific Aim (2)  
Given the 48 comparisons completed for this aim, a Bonferroni-corrected significance 
level of 1.04E-3 was used. 
Metacognitive control is positively associated with objective memory performance, 
but subjective memory complaints and FAD are not (Hypothesis a). Pearson’s r correlations 
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were calculated to determine the relationship between MFQ scores, FAD measures, study time 
differences in the self-paced condition, and objective memory functioning across computer- and 
self-paced trials.  As indicated in Table 9, subjective memory complaints and anticipatory 
dementia measures were not significantly associated with objective memory functioning on any 
computer- or self-paced trial, or across trials.  However, total study time difference between self-
paced and computer-paced trials was significantly associated with performance on self-paced 
Trial 1 (r(89) = .379, p <. 001) and with the self-paced trials total score (r(89) = .345, p < .001) at 
the Bonferroni-corrected level of significance. 
Metacognitive monitoring is positively associated with objective memory 
performance (Hypothesis b).  To address this hypothesis, Pearson’s r correlations were 
calculated.  Results are also summarized in Table 9.  The total JOL estimate across all computer-
paced trials was significantly positively associated with objective memory performance on 
computer-paced Trial 2 (r(90) = .407, p < .001) and with performance across all computer-paced 
trials (r(90) = .396, p < .001).  In contrast, the total JOL estimate across all self-paced trials was 
significant positively associated with performance on computer-paced Trial 2 (r(90) = .492, p < 
.001), computer-paced Trial 3 (r(90) = .472, p < .001), computer-paced trials total (r(90) = .509, p < 
.001), self-paced Trial 1 (r(90) = .436, p < .001), self-paced Trial 2 (r(90) = .530, p < .001), Trial 3 
(r(90) = .504, p < .001), and self-paced trials total (r(90) = .526, p < .001). 
Among metacognitive variables, metacognitive monitoring accounts for the greatest 
amount of variance in objective memory functioning (Hypothesis c).  To address Hypothesis 
(c), MFQ total score, FADS total score, ADI total score, JOL estimates across all computer-
paced trials, JOL estimates across all self-paced trials, and study time differences between self- 
and computer-paced trials were entered simultaneously into a regression equation to account for 
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variance in objective memory functioning.  These measures were regressed onto computer-paced 
objective memory functioning and self-paced objective memory functioning separately.  The 
results are summarized in Table 10.  The squared semi-partial correlations were then assessed to 
determine the unique proportion of variance in the outcome accounted for by each of the 
metacognitive variables.  Self-paced JOL estimates accounted for the highest proportion of 
unique variance in memory performance on computer-paced trials (12.53%, t = 3.825, p < .001) 
and self-paced trials (19.27%, t = 5.00, p < .001).  Metacognitive control also accounted for a 
significant proportion of variance in computer-paced memory performance (4.37%, t = -2.256, p 
= .027), and self-paced memory performance (4.41%, t = 2.389, p = .019).  None of the other 
metacognitive variables accounted for significant unique variance in objective memory 
functioning. 
Specific Aim (3) 
 Metacognitive monitoring during self-paced trials is associated with metacognitive 
control (Hypothesis a).  To assess this aim, Pearson’s r correlations between JOL estimates for 
individual trials and across trials in the two conditions and study time differences were examined 
(see Table 11).  Metacognitive monitoring was not significantly associated with metacognitive 
control on any of the computer-paced trials.  In contrast, study time differences were 
significantly positively associated with JOL estimates on self-paced Trial 3 (r(89) = .248, p = 
.018) and across all self-paced trials (r(89) = .226, p = .031). 
FAD is not associated with metacognitive monitoring, and it does not impact 
metacognitive control (Hypotheses b and c). Because none of the FAD measures were 
significantly associated with any of the JOL estimates, JOL resolutions, or study time 
differences, Hypothesis (b) was not analyzed further.   
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
The present study investigated a common problem among the ‘worried well’ population 
of middle- and older-aged adults: Fear of Alzheimer’s disease.  The study provided further 
evidence of the shared variance between FAD and emotional constructs, including depression 
and trait-level negative affect.  The study also examined the relationship between FAD and 
cognitive constructs, such as general subjective memory complaints, task-specific metacognitive 
monitoring and control, and actual memory performance.  Results indicate that FAD may 
constitute perceptual and emotional experiences, as opposed to a cognitive phenomenon, as it is 
not linked to ability to accurately monitor one’s performance, ability to change behavior to 
improve performance, or objective recall ability.  Finally, the study introduced a new, theory-
driven approach to assessing FAD: the Anticipatory Dementia Inventory. 
Results indicated that, contrary to prior research (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996; 2001; Roberts 
& Connell, 2000; Cantegreil-Kallen & Pin, 2012; Leon et al., 2015), individuals with a family 
history of dementia or of caregiving for individuals with dementia did not report a higher level of 
FAD.  These findings may be explained by the relatively older sample assessed in the study, 
whose mean age was approximately 69 years.  Although almost equal numbers of participants 
with and without a family history of AD were included, this family history was self-reported and 
largely based on participants’ perception, rather than on formal diagnosis of a parent with 
dementia.  Many participants attributed their lack of knowledge of specific dementia diagnosis to 
the fact that knowledge of Alzheimer’s disease was more limited and formal diagnosis of 
dementia, let alone AD, was much less common when their parents were aging.  Furthermore, 
anecdotal evidence from most family history positive participants indicated that parents with 
dementia often died early in their disease course, which may have lessened participants’ fear-
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producing experiences with AD.  The relatively older age of the sample may also have been 
associated with reduced FAD; older participants may have surpassed the perceived age of onset 
of AD, thereby lessening their level of fear.  The finding that caregiving for AD is not associated 
with FAD, which also contradicts prior literature, may be accounted for by the fact that most 
caregiving positive participants reported doing so only professionally.  Individuals whose 
occupation involved caregiving may have more accurate perceptions about AD prevalence and 
treatments, as well as greater self-efficacy with health behaviors, both of which would reduce 
FAD.  Furthermore, a recent study proposed that proximity to AD through caregiving or family 
history may be a predictor of level of FAD only in younger to middle-aged adults (Cantegreil-
Kallen & Pin, 2012).  Nonetheless, the finding challenges the role of family history and 
caregiving in developing a ‘worried well’ presentation.  While these experiences may contribute 
to perceived personal vulnerability to AD, neither family history nor personal exposure to AD 
independently produce concern that one will develop AD.  Other characteristics, such as 
resilience to FAD, belief in treatments, or self-efficacy, may balance out the effect of family or 
caregiving history. 
The current study corroborated prior findings (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996; 2001) that 
anticipatory dementia is associated with greater subjective memory complaints. However, the 
hypothesis that FAD would also be negatively associated with metacognitive monitoring was not 
supported.  The number of items participants expected to recall across trials was the same, 
regardless of FAD level.  This finding could be explained if all participants were providing 
similar, low estimates of performance, but only individuals high in FAD were accurately rating 
their poor performance.  However, FAD also had no effect on metacognitive resolution, 
suggesting that individuals who are more fearful are no less accurate at rating their memory of a 
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list of words than those who are less fearful.  Similarly, FAD level was not associated with 
scores on measures of overall cognitive functioning (TICS, Synonym or Antonym Vocabulary 
Tests), or with memory performance.   
The above findings collectively differentiate subjective memory complaints from task-
specific memory ratings.  Indeed, investigation of the relationship between subjective memory 
complaints and metacognitive monitoring and resolution showed no significant association.  
Although a healthy, non-impaired individual may accurately monitor his ability to learn and 
remember information immediately and specifically to a memory task, an intervening process 
may cause him to misperceive the accumulation of these ratings over time to yield subjective 
memory complaints that drive FAD.  Given the findings that FAD and subjective memory 
complaints are associated with trait-level negative affect, it is likely that this intervening process 
is affective in nature.   
The association between subjective memory complaints and FAD, combined with the 
lack of relationships between metacognition and FAD and objective memory functioning and 
FAD provides support for the stereotype threat theory of FAD development.  FAD may be 
interpreted as a failure to engage in task-specific metacognitive monitoring on a daily basis and, 
instead, an expectation of memory failure that increases anxiety, reduces attentional resources, 
and provides the individual with perceived ‘evidence’ that their memory is actually failing. 
The study replicated prior findings that subjective memory complaints were not tied to 
objective memory performance (Jungwirth et al., 2004; Ponds, Van Boxtel, & Jolles, 2000; 
Lenehan, Klekociuk, & Summers, 2012).  Given the hypothesized relationship between SMCs 
and FAD, it is not surprising that FAD is also not associated with memory functioning.  
However, this conclusion does highlight that FAD is based neither on actual memory failures, 
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nor an accurate appraisal of memory. Conversely, metacognitive monitoring was significantly 
associated with objective memory performance.  This finding again underlines that, regardless of 
level of FAD, self-rating and performance should be related.  An unexpected conclusion from the 
analyses is the relationship between metacognitive control and memory performance on the self-
paced list-learning task.  Participants who increased their study time were able to recall more 
words.  Given the significant positive relationship between metacognitive monitoring and 
control, this association emphasizes that, in a healthy sample, accurate metacognitive monitoring 
can drive changes in behavior that can lead to improved performance.  
In sum, the results of the present study point to a dissociation between more affectively-
changed self-rating processes (subjective memory complaints, FAD) and more cognitive 
appraisals (metacognitive monitoring, resolution, and control).  Although only the latter are 
grounded in actual memory functioning, both task-specific and general memory ratings appear to 
cause significant distress that may interfere with functioning in daily life. 
A final goal of the study was to examine FAD through the Health Belief Model through 
the development of the Anticipatory Dementia Index (ADI).  While prior studies have examined 
the symptoms of FAD using the Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease Scale (FADS; French, Floyd, 
Wilkins & Osato, 2012; Moon, Kim, Hoi, Oh & Chan, 2014), these studies were limited in that 
they could not identify potential targets for intervention to reduce FAD.  As FAD accounts for 
significant distress reported in large proportions of international samples (Anderson, Day, Beard, 
Reed & Wu, 2009; Cantegreil-Kallen & Pin, 2012; Werner, 2002; Leon et al., 2015) and drives 
change in health behaviors (Ramakers et al., 2009; Corner & Bond, 2004), a better understanding 
of causes of the phenomenon was sought.  The study supports the notion that FAD can be 
examined through the lens of the Health Belief Model (Rosenstock et al., 1988). 
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The Health Belief Model (Rosenstock et al., 1988) proposes that health beliefs and 
behaviors are shaped not only by perceived threat of a disorder or problem, but also one’s 
expectations for effectively reducing the threat.  The primary component of FAD reflects overall 
negative affect and specific concerns about AD.  This component maps cleanly onto the 
‘Perceived Seriousness of Consequences’ aspect of the Health Belief Model (1988).  The 
component is also most closely tied to other measures of FAD.  Among specific concerns about 
AD, fear of not being able to contribute to society (Item #49), fear of being a burden on one’s 
family (Item #43), concern about loss of decision-making abilities (Item #42), and concern over 
the financial burden of AD (Item #45) were most commonly endorsed by all participants, 
regardless of FAD level.  These items demonstrate that FAD is not simply concern over memory 
loss or physical symptoms, but rather a concern over the larger impact of FAD on one’s place 
within the family and society.   
The second component of the ADI represents physical symptoms in response to these AD 
concerns.  It likely also shares a large proportion of variance with the FADS measure, which also 
assesses physical reactions in FAD.  Interestingly, very few participants endorsed the three major 
items comprising this component, suggesting that even those individuals who are most fearful do 
not experience sleep disturbances, shakiness or restlessness, or nausea in response to FAD.  This 
component would also fall under the ‘Perceived Seriousness of Consequences’ facet of the 
Health Belief Model. 
The fourth component of the ADI, which reflects personal vulnerability to AD, 
constitutes to ‘Perceived Susceptibility’ facet of the Health Belief Model.  Items 28 (“I believe 
that I am going to develop AD”) and 23 (“I believe that I am already showing signs of AD.”) 
were the most commonly endorsed of Component 4, but were endorsed only by the most fearful 
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individuals.  It was expected that other items related to perceptions of susceptibility to AD would 
load onto this component or form additional components.  Although loadings are relatively 
lower, items from Components 9 through 12 represent beliefs about the normal versus abnormal 
memory loss with aging and perceptions of the heritability of AD.  Given that recent studies have 
highlighted the importance of normative beliefs in FAD (Leon et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2015), 
future iterations of the scale will revise these items to more clearly tap into these constructs, as 
they constitute an important facet of FAD. In sum, Components 4, 9, 10, 11, and 12 likely 
measure Perceived Susceptibility, Components 1 and 2 measure Perceived Seriousness of 
Consequences, and all items in these components tap into some aspect of Perceived Threat of 
AD. 
The third and fifth components of the ADI represent into the Outcome Expectations facet 
of the Health Belief Model.  Items in Component 3 reflect belief in the efficacy of treatments for 
AD.  Item #4 (“If I am diagnosed with AD, there is nothing doctors will be able to do to improve 
my outcomes.”) and #22 (“There are treatments that can slow or stop the progression of AD”; 
reverse-scored) were most strongly endorsed by individuals high in FAD.  These items represent 
a mindset about the intractability of AD that would likely contribute to FAD.  The fifth 
component assesses beliefs in one’s ability to effectively reduce risk for AD by changing 
behavior.  Somewhat unexpectedly, the two self-efficacy items most commonly endorsed tapped 
into a belief that consuming a healthy diet (Item #12) and participating in social activities (Item 
#15) were the best strategies to reduce AD risk, as compared to engaging in physical or 
cognitively-stimulating activities.  Nonetheless, these items reflect an important target for 
treatment of FAD.  A recent review of a French public health intervention to decrease FAD 
determined that inaccurate knowledge about the availability and efficacy of medical and 
48  
 
behavioral interventions is a critical predictor of FAD (Leon et al., 2015). 
The items of the final component tap into resilience against worry about AD (“Thinking 
about AD does not make me worry.”), and it may be a gross measure of overall level of FAD 
once Perceived Vulnerability, Perceived Seriousness of Consequences, and Outcome 
Expectations are processed.   
These results corroborate the findings of a recent qualitative Australian study in which 
focus groups were interviewed to determine their knowledge of dementia risk factors and their 
motivation to engage in lifestyle changes that would reduce the likelihood of dementia (Kim et 
al., 2015).  Although participants were able to list non-modifiable risk factors (age, genetics) and 
modifiable risk factors (diet, exercise, mental stimulation, social activity), there were 
considerable misperceptions about dementia as a normal part of aging and about relative benefit 
of risk factors.  The study found evidence of three groups differing in level of perceived 
susceptibility: a fearful group, who were unable to approach actually estimating their likelihood 
of developing dementia because of their fear, a rational group, who reviewed their lifestyle and 
risk factors (with variable accuracy) to produce an estimate of dementia risk, and a cynical 
group, whose external locus of control drove them to estimate their chances of developing 
dementia as random, based on luck or chance.  Avoidance of dementia and death due to dementia 
were the most commonly cited benefits of changing health behaviors, while limited education 
was the most commonly cited barrier.  These findings echo the early conclusions from the ADI.  
The ADI may also be clinically useful as a measure of FAD that is more efficient than qualitative 
focus group interviewing to identify public perception of AD. 
Limitations 
Although the study provided important, novel information about the construct of FAD, it 
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was somewhat limited.  The small sample size tested in this pilot study was not sufficient for true 
scale development. Furthermore, the sample was community dwelling and cognitively intact.  
Given these sample characteristics, relatively few individuals demonstrated high FAD.  Future 
studies should investigate a clinical sample that includes individuals with true memory 
impairment and individuals whose concern is significant enough to warrant neuropsychological 
or other medical evaluation.  This more clinical sample will allow researchers to investigate the 
convergent and discriminant validity between FAD and other constructs.  A larger sample with a 
revised scale would permit confirmatory factor analytic studies to further conceptualize FAD as 
part of a health belief model. 
Other characteristics of the sample may have also impacted FAD.  The sample was 
highly educated and relatively older.  As previously mentioned, older adults may believe that the 
older they are without a diagnosis of AD, the less likely they are to experience it (Kim et al., 
2015).  More educated adults may also have more accurate perceptions of AD prevalence and 
risk factors, lowering the overall level of FAD in the sample.  Future studies should examine a 
greater proportion of middle-aged adults, with more varied education. 
Finally, it may be helpful to examine the relationship between FAD and metacognition 
through a different metacognitive monitoring task.  While the present study utilized a judgment 
of learning task that required assessment of learning prior to recall, a feeling of knowing (FOK) 
task, in which the participant rates how many items they recalled after the recall trial, may have 
been more appropriate.  Anecdotally, some participants rushed through the JOL estimates, as 
they saw it as a distraction from working memory rehearsal of the final items on the list.  If recall 
had already occurred as in the FOK task, more effort and concentration might have been 





The study presents many clinical implications.  The shared variance between FAD, 
negative affect and subjective memory complaints, when compared to the lack of association 
between FAD and metacognitive variables, suggests that treatment of FAD should focus on 
affective rather than cognitive strategies.  Because FAD does not seem to be shaped by actual 
memory performance or self-awareness during a memory task, feedback strategies may not be 
effective in reducing FAD. Conversely, education about risk factors and normal versus abnormal 
memory decline may target perceived susceptibility to dementia, thereby reducing perceived 
threat.  Similarly, education about availability of treatments and appropriate times to seek 
evaluation may decrease FAD.  Finally, interventions to shift locus of control regarding AD 
development from external (genetics, chance, luck) to internal (lifestyle and health behavior) 
may increase self-efficacy and outcome expectations, also reducing FAD. As an example, a 
recent Australian public health intervention has shown promise in correcting misperceptions 
about dementia and increasing knowledge of and motivation for risk factor change via an 
informational website (Farrow, 2013). 
The Anticipatory Dementia Index constitutes a promising new method for assessing not 
only intensity and implications of FAD, but also personal causes.  It may be used to identify 
subtypes of FAD that may benefit differentially from interventional strategies.  For instance, the 
ADI may allow clinicians to determine whether a ‘worried well’ patient simply has a 
misperception of his own vulnerability to the disorder, as opposed to a lack of understanding or 
motivation to reduce his vulnerability.  The first patient may simply need normalizing education 
to reduce his fear, whereas the second patient may require more prescriptive lifestyle change to 
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address his FAD.  Future studies should continue development of the scale with rewording and 






























           
 














Perceived Susceptibility to AD 
• Beliefs about AD etiology (genetic 
vs. lifestyle) 
• Beliefs about AD prevalence 
• Appraisal of one’s memory failures 
as normal aging vs. AD-related 
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(Fear that I am developing AD and 
cannot avoid the negative 





(Beliefs about ability to 
address perceived AD 
threat) 
Perceived Benefits & Barriers of Taking 
Action 
• Knowledge about treatments for AD 
and their effectiveness 
• Knowledge about lifestyle changes 
to reduce AD risk and their 
effectiveness 
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Skewness and Kurtosis of Distributions of Outcome Variables 
Skewness Kurtosis 
None Moderate Substantial None Moderate Substantial 
STAI State + x 
STAI Trait + x 
GDS + + 
MFQ x x 
FADS + x 
ADI x x 
CP Pre-estimate x x 
CP Trial 1 JOL Estimate x x 
CP Trial 2 JOL Estimate + + 
CP Trial 3 JOL Estimate + + 
CP Trial 1 Resolution x + 
CP Trial 2 Resolution x + 
CP Trial 3 Resolution x x 
CP Total Resolution x + 
CP Trial 1 Raw Score x - 
CP Trial 2 Raw Score x x 
CP Trial 3 Raw Score x x 
CP Raw Total x x 
SP Pre-estimate + + 
SP Trial 1 JOL Estimate + + 
SP Trial 2 JOL Estimate + + 
SP Trial 3 JOL Estimate + + 
SP Trial 1 Resolution - + 
SP Trial 2 Resolution x + 
SP Trial 3 Resolution x + 
SP Total Resolution - + 
SP Trial 1 Raw Score x - 
SP Trial 2 Raw Score x - 
SP Trial 3 Raw Score x x 
SP Raw Total x x 
Study Time Difference   +   x     
Note. STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; GDS = Geriatric Depression Scale; MFQ = 
Memory Functioning Questionnaire; FADS = Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease Scale; ADI = 
Anticipatory Dementia Inventory; CP = Computer-Paced Condition; SP = Self-Paced Condition; 
JOL = Judgment of Learning.  No skewness or kurtosis was characterized by skewness or 
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kurtosis statistics between -.499 and .499.  Moderate skewness or kurtosis describes variable 
distributions with skewness and kurtosis statistics between -.999 to -.500 and .500 to .999.  
Substantial skewness or kurtosis describes variable distributions with skewness or kurtosis 






Group mean differences on FAD based on family history of dementia or caregiving history 
 
 






















Correlations between FAD, subjective memory complaints, and negative affect (n = 88) 
    MFQ Total STAI - State STAI-Trait GDS 
FADS r -.444 .169 .154 .214 
  p 1.20E-5** .019* .031* 2.82E-3** 
ADI r -.326 .209 .248 .287 
  p 1.69E-3** 3.61E-2* 5.31E-4** 6.2E-5** 
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < 2.50 E-2 (subjective memory complaints Bonferroni-corrected 
significance level) or p < 6.25 E-3 (negative affect Bonferroni corrected significance level); 
FADS = Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease Scale; ADI = Anticipatory Dementia Inventory; MFQ = 





















Correlations between FAD versus JOL Estimates and JOL Resolution on Computer-Paced List-
Learning Trials (n = 88) 
 
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < 1.56E-3 (Bonferroni-corrected significance level); FADS = Fear of 
Alzheimer’s Disease Scale; ADI = Anticipatory Dementia Inventory; T1 = Trial 1; T2 = Trial 2; 




















Correlations between FAD versus JOL Estimates and JOL Resolution on Computer-Paced List-
Learning Trials (n = 88) 
 
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < 1.56E-3 (Bonferroni-corrected significance level); FADS = Fear of 
Alzheimer’s Disease Scale; ADI = Anticipatory Dementia Inventory; T1 = Trial 1; T2 = Trial 2; 























































Table 8, Continued 
















Table 8, Continued 














Table 8, Continued  

















Correlations between metacognitive variables and objective memory functioning (n = 88) 
 
Note. * = significant at p < .05; ** = significant at p < 1.04 E-3 (Bonferroni-corrected 
significance level); MFQ = Memory Functioning Questionnaire; FADS = Fear of Alzheimer’s 
Disease Scale; ADI = Anticipatory Dementia Inventory; CP = Computer-Paced Condition; SP = 

















Unique variance in objective memory functioning accounted for by metacognitive variables 
 
Note. * = significant at p < .05; ; MFQ = Memory Functioning Questionnaire; FADS = Fear of 
Alzheimer’s Disease Scale; ADI = Anticipatory Dementia Inventory; CP = Computer-Paced 



















Correlations between Measures of Metacognitive Monitoring and Metacognitive Control (n = 
88) 
 
Note. * = significant at p < .05; ** = significant at p < .005 (Bonferroni-corrected significance 
















Anticipatory Dementia Inventory (ADI) - Page 1 
 
Below is a list of statements that middle- and older-aged adults might say about 
Alzheimer’s disease and how it might affect one’s life.  Please read each statement 
carefully, and then put an ‘X’ in the box that best represents how much you agree or 
disagreement with the statement right now, today. 
 
0 = Strongly      1 = Somewhat      2 = Neutral /Neither     3 = Somewhat       4 = Strongly 
      Disagree              Disagree           Agree nor Disagree            Agree                Agree 
 
    0 1 2 3 4 
1 
Some forgetfulness is normal for people my age 
and older.           
2 
It is normal to occasionally forget things ike where 
I placed my keys or when I have scheduled 
appointments.           
3 
Most older people with memory problems has 
Alzheimer's disease.           
4 
If I am diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease, there is 
nothing doctors will be able to do to improve my 
outcomes.           
5 
Forgetting dates and appointments or where I put 
things might mean I have Alzheimer's disease.           
6 
Alzheimer's disease is a common problem among 
older adults.           
7 I am in control of my health as I age.           
8 
I can make changes in my lifestyle that will help 
me live a longer, healthier life.           
9 
If I am diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease, there is 
nothing I can do to improve my outcomes.           
10 
There is nothing I can do to slow the aging process 
or improve my health as I age.           
11 
There is nothing I can do to slow the progresson of 
Alzheimer's disease.           
12 
I can reduce my chances of developing Alzheimer's 
disease by eating a healthier diet.           
13 
I can reduced my chances of developing 
Alzheimer's disease by staying physically active.           
14 
I can reduce my chances of developing Alzheimer's 
disease by using my brain in new ways, like doing 
crosswords, Sudoku, or reading.           
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APPENDIX A CONTINUED 
 
Anticipatory Dementia Inventory (ADI) – Page 2 
 
0 = Strongly      1 = Somewhat      2 = Neutral /Neither     3 = Somewhat       4 = Strongly 




I can reduce my chances of developing Alzheimer's 
disease by spending time with my family and 
friends.           
16 Alzheimer's disease is relatively rare.           
17 
If I have a family member with Alzheimer's 
disease, I will likely develop it too.           
18 
There are no treatments to slow or stop the 
progression of Alzheimer's disease.           
19 
Whether I will develop Alzheimer's disease will 
depend on my lifestyle as well as whether a family 
member passed it down to me.           
20 
I do not believe that I will develop Alzheimer's 
disease.           
21 
Thinking about getting Alzheimer's disease does 
not make me worry.           
22 
There are treatments that can slow or stop the 
progression of Alzheimer's disease.           
23 
I believe that I am already showing signs of 
Alzheimer's disease.             
24 
If I had Alzheimer's disease and there was a 
treatment to STOP it, I would take it.           
25 
If I had Alzheimer's disease and there was a 
treatment to SLOW it, I would take it.           
26 I believe that I already have Alzheimer's disease.           
27 
I feel calm when thinking about Alzheimer's 
disease.           
28 
I believe that I am going to develop Alzheimer's 
disease.           
29 Alzheimer's disease is inherited from parents.           
30 
I do believe that I am showing early symptoms of 
Alzheimer's disease.           
31 
Thinking about getting Alzheimer's disease makes 
me feel anxious.           
32 
Thinking about getting Alzheimer's disease makes 
me feel hopeless/makes me want to give up.           
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APPENDIX A CONTINUED 
 
Anticipatory Dementia Inventory (ADI) - Page 3. 
 
0 = Strongly      1 = Somewhat      2 = Neutral /Neither     3 = Somewhat       4 = Strongly 
      Disagree              Disagree           Agree nor Disagree            Agree                Agree 
 
    0 1 2 3 4 
33 
If I had Alzheimer's disease and there was a 
treatment to slow or stop it, I would NOT take it.           
34 
Thinking about getting Alzheimer's disease makes 
me feel angry.           
35 
Thinking about getting Alzheimer's disease makes 
me feel sad.           
36 
When I think about Alzheimer's disease, my 
stomach is in knots/I feel nauseated.           
37 
When I think about Alzheimer's disease, my hands 
shake.           
38 I lose sleep worrying about Alzheimer's disease.           
39 
I find it difficult to concentrate because I am 
distracted by thoughts of developing Alzheimer's 
disease.           
40 
Just because I have a family member with 
Alzheimer's disease does not mean I will get it too.           
41 
I worry about losing my memory for loved ones if I 
develop Alzheimer's disease.           
42 
I worry that I will not be able to make decisions 
independently if I develop Alzheimer's disease.           
43 
I worry that I will be a burden on my family if I 
develop Alzheimer's disease.           
44 
I worry about feeling physically unwell if I develop 
Alzheimer's disease.           
45 
I worry about the financial burden of developing 
Alzheimer's disease.           
46 
I worry about how others will judge me if I develop 
Alzheimer's disease.           
47 
I worry about losing important relationships in my 
life if I develop Alzheimer's disease.           
48 
I worry about having to move out of my home if I 
develop Alzheimer's disease.           
49 
I will not be able to contribute to society if I 
develop Alzheimer's disease.           





Word Lists for List-Learning Task (Woodard, 1991) 
 
Computer-Paced Word List  Self-Paced Word List    
reflex      hint      
flag      impulse     
salad      link      
month      toast      
idea      mood      
plain      queen      
winter      pepper      
ocean      silence      
tank      odor      
flower      limb      
boulder     iron      
insect      market      
dust      woods      
honor      hall      
garden      clock      
death      rock      
air      anger      
heaven      bar      
jail      dirt      
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 Introduction: Fear of Alzheimer’s disease (FAD), or Anticipatory Dementia, is a healthy 
adult’s misinterpretation of everyday memory failures as indicators of developing dementia.  The 
current study investigated the construct of FAD and aimed to contextualize FAD within the 
Health Belief Model through development of a new scale, the Anticipatory Dementia Index 
(ADI).  The study also assessed the relationship between FAD and metacognitive monitoring and 
metacognitive control.   
 Methods: 94 cognitively-intact  community-dwelling older adults with and without a 
history of family history of AD completed questionnaires regarding their subjective memory 
complaints, state and trait anxiety, depression, and multiple measures of FAD, including the 
ADI.  Participants also completed a list-learning task in which they were required to provide 
Judgment of Learning estimates of their recall after each trial (metacognitive monitoring) and to 
adjust their study time based on their perceived performance (metacognitive control).   
 Results: There were no differences in FAD based on family history of AD or caregiving.  
FAD was significantly associated with subjective memory complaints, trait-level negative affect, 
and depression.  FAD was not associated with metacognitive monitoring or accuracy of 
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monitoring, metacognitive control, or objective memory functioning.  Metacognitive monitoring 
and increased study time were associated with memory performance.  Finally, the ADI is 
comprised of six components that map FAD onto the Health Belief Model.   
 Conclusions: FAD appears to be more affective than cognitive.  Interventions for FAD 
should increase public knowledge of prevalence and risk for AD, and increase self-efficacy and 
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